Human-Machine Communication

Volume 4, 2022
https://doi.org/10.30658/hmc.4.6

Considering the Context to Build Theory in HCI,
HRI, and HMC: Explicating Differences in Processes
of Communication and Socialization With
Social Technologies
Andrew Gambino1

and Bingjie Liu2

1 Department of Communication Studies, Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong
2 Department of Communication Studies, California State University, Los Angeles, CA, USA

Abstract
The proliferation and integration of social technologies has occurred quickly, and the
specific technologies with which we engage are ever-changing. The dynamic nature of
the development and use of social technologies is often acknowledged by researchers
as a limitation. In this manuscript, however, we present a discussion on the implications
of our modern technological context by focusing on processes of socialization and communication that are fundamentally different from their interpersonal corollary. These are
presented and discussed with the goal of providing theoretical building blocks toward a
more robust understanding of phenomena of human-computer interaction, human-robot
interaction, human-machine communication, and interpersonal communication.
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Introduction
Advances in computer technologies have resulted in the development of diverse and increasingly social technologies. Concurrently, we find these social technologies being adopted
and used more frequently. As a product of these developments, social technologies facilitate
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a growing amount of our communication, both as mediators (as in the case of computermediated communication, CMC) and as interactants (as in the case of human-computer
interaction, HCI, and human-machine communication, HMC).
As communication scholars, the pace of technological advances, development of features and products, and their adoption present opportunities and challenges (Fortunati &
Edwards, 2021; J. Fox & Gambino, 2021). On one hand, we are well-positioned to examine
the social features that gain popularity with established methods and experience studying
processes of communication both on- and offline. On the other hand, our research can be
outpaced by developments in the modern technological landscape. To address this issue,
we often focus our inquiries conceptually rather than technically through an affordancebased approach (Evans et al., 2016; Flanagin, 2020; J. Fox & Gambino, 2021; J. Fox &
McEwan, 2017; Gambino et al., 2020; Rodríguez-Hidalgo, 2020; Sundar et al., 2015). An
affordance-based approach engages with the concept underlying a feature or use, such as
recordability or publicness, to establish a generalizable effect across features, platforms, and
media. We strongly endorse the social affordance-based approach to the study of social
technologies, and it is our aim in this manuscript to demonstrate the complementary utility
of contextual factors of digital HMC through the lens of extant communication and social
psychology theories.
Spence (2019) and Fortunati and Edwards (2021) have centrally positioned the question of “how” in the development of HMC theory. In limited space, Spence (2019) detailed
avenues for the advancement of HMC theory. One such avenue, the process of applying
existing theories from communication and related disciplines, is discussed, but framed as a
separate endeavor from building “theories central to HMC” which Spence notes, “do exist
and are being developed, tested and refined” (p. 286). We agree with both perspectives
forwarded by Spence, particularly with respect to theory development (see: Edwards et al.,
2019; Spence et al., 2014; Westerman et al., 2020). Here, we advance a third perspective
that incorporates both the former and the latter. Namely, that communication scholars
are uniquely positioned to build HMC theories through consideration of the relationship
between contextual factors in HMC and those in theories of communication and relationships. With this perspective, communication scholars can both build theories that provide
a more precise and comprehensive understanding of socio-technological phenomena and
find answers to questions of extant theories of communication and relationships.
In this manuscript, we demonstrate the utility of our perspective through a discussion
of two theoretical perspectives. Specifically, we explicate the processes of socialization and
message production in the HMC context. We focus on the differences between the HMC
and interpersonal context, advancing from description to theoretical potential. We first
present our broader argument by engaging with processes of socialization, drawing heavily
on social learning theory (Bandura, 1977, 1989). We then examine processes of interpersonal communication, focusing on contextually driven differences in goal structure that
underlie message production (Dillard & Solomon, 2000).

Explicating the Context of HCI and HMC
Contextual factors play a central role in shaping how a communication episode unfolds
(Dillard & Solomon, 2000). Communication is central in most human endeavors; as a
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collective, the study of communication is multidisciplinary. We often define our research
categorically, based on broad contextual differences in the persons (e.g., interpersonal communication, small-group communication) or the content of the communication act (e.g.,
health communication, political communication). HCI and HMC carry a bit of both, with
differences in content (often digital or mediated) as well as differences in the interactant
(Guzman & Lewis, 2020). Despite sharing qualities with other subfields, HMC is often considered a unique context. In practice, context is rarely explicated and is frequently used
as a catch-all explanation for findings. As empirical studies have found both similarities
(Edwards et al., 2020; Ho et al., 2018; S. K. Lee et al., 2021; Meng & Dai, 2021; Xu, 2019) and
differences between HMC and interpersonal communication (Edwards & Edwards, 2022;
Jia et al., 2022; Kim & Song, 2021; Liu & Wei, 2021; van Straten et al., 2021; van Straten at
al., 2022; Zellou et al., 2021), we argue that explication of the HMC context in relation to
the interpersonal corollary is necessary to provide meaningful and nuanced explanations
for groups of findings, and, ultimately, to build theories of both HMC and interpersonal
communication.
Following Dillard and Solomon (2000), we demonstrate how major contextual factors
of digital HMC (i.e., communication with a computer or computer-powered agent, inclusive of physical, virtual, and any hybrid-type forms) can be utilized to engage with extant
theories. As Guzman and Lewis (2020) suggested, central to HMC is the nonhuman nature
of the interactant or partner. Fox and Gambino (2021) engaged with the implications of
humanoid social robots and how their varying levels of social affordances relate to relational development theories. For example, they suggested the inappropriateness of applying
social penetration theory (Altman & Taylor, 1973) to relationships between humans and
social robots, as social robots have limited abilities to retain (i.e., persistence) and recall
(i.e., searchability) prior interactions. These deficiencies make it difficult to have in-depth
conversations with social robots, and deep conversations are considered essential to the
development of relationships (Altman & Taylor, 1973).
In this manuscript, we present context as an integral consideration to theory development. We demonstrate the usefulness of such considerations through the examples of
socialization and message production. In the case of long-term socialization, we focus our
discussion on social learning theory and how consideration of the digital context provides
ground for novel inquiries. In the case of message production, considering the context of
digital HMC both provide a novel method of studying the interpersonal phenomenon of
goal structures and allow for a valid assessment of the specific aspects of the framework
relevant to the conditions of HMC.

Social Learning Theory: Observational and Experiential
Learning in HMC
Researchers in HCI and digital HMC understand a critical contextual factor: computers are
not human, and most people believe computers do not require or deserve social treatment
(Reeves & Nass, 1996). We see the dichotomy of social and nonsocial, however, to be a bit
limited for a comprehensive understanding of the modern technological context. In studies,
researchers can cite differences in perceptions of sociability or some specific but nongeneralizable differences between a human and a computer as explanations for their findings. For
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example, heuristics (i.e., mental shortcuts) that are formed within systems of social cognition (Fiske & Taylor, 1984) are frequently invoked to explain differences between humans
and media agents (e.g., Gambino et al., 2019). Often, differences between perceptions of
humans and digital interlocutors are attributed to such heuristics that, in practice, account
for groups or sets of features and affordances that likely differ between the objects of study.
In this manuscript, we aim to provide researchers with an approach that allows for the construction of theories unique to digital HMC, as well as a path to improve the precision of
extant theories through the study of social technologies. We first discuss the larger process
of socialization through the lens of Bandura’s social learning theory (1971).
Social learning theory was developed by Albert Bandura (1971; Bandura & Walters,
1963), building on the work of Robert Sears (1957). Although both suggest that persons
develop through social interactions, Bandura and Walters (1963) noted the importance of
observational learning and the role it could play in the acquisition of a person’s behavioral practices and norms (Grusec, 1992). The observational learning component is perhaps best exemplified by the “bobo doll” studies (Bandura, 1965; Bandura et al., 1961).
In Bandura et al. (1961), children demonstrated more aggressive behaviors after watching aggressive behaviors. Additionally, Bandura (1965) demonstrated that the tendency to
engage in aggressive behaviors is influenced by whether the model’s aggressive behaviors
were rewarded or punished, a phenomenon known as vicarious reinforcement. As predicted,
children that saw aggressive behaviors rewarded were more likely to behave aggressively,
whereas children that saw aggressive behaviors punished were less likely to behave aggressively. Through observational learning and vicarious reinforcement, Bandura demonstrated
that people could learn both an act and its consequences through observation.
Jesse Fox and her colleagues have demonstrated that observational learning and vicarious reinforcement processes occur also within virtual environments (J. Fox & Bailenson,
2009; J. Fox et al., 2013; J. A. Fox, 2010). For example, J. Fox and Bailenson (2009) found
participants exercised more after watching their avatar experience reward (shrinking in
size) and punishment (growing in size). Notably, in their second study, J. Fox and Bailenson
(2009) found that these effects were more pronounced when the representations resembled
the participant. As J. Fox and Bailenson (2009) suggested, virtual environments provide
new ground to study identification; the form a person can take in a virtual environment,
either volitionally or non-volitionally, is qualitatively different, and greater in number, than
in our natural setting.
In addition to social learning occurring within virtual environments, here we consider
the implications for social development that occurs within digital HMC but outside of the
virtual environment. Consider the use of a computer. Although we can infer social elements
within a virtual environment to construct our models for navigating social environments
(Walther, 1992; Walther, 1996), direct observation or engagement of acts and outcomes are
restricted. In physical environments, people can more easily observe social episodes. For
example, children can observe bullying on a playground without being directly involved
as the bully or the bullied person. Within a virtual environment, such an act is observable
by the user of the computer, but for a third party, such as a child observing his or her parent using the computer, these acts and their consequences are less observable because of
physical and digital barriers or boundaries. Related to social learning, rewards and punishments may be understood by the engaged user, but they are less likely to be understood

Gambino and Liu

115

by third parties through traditional processes of observational learning. These deviceinduced boundaries are examined by researchers in developmental psychology. For example,
researchers have found that parental engagement with social technologies can bring about
relational barriers with their children (For review: Hassinger-Das et al., 2020). In an experiment, Gaudreau et al. (2021) found that children asked fewer questions to phone-engaged
parents while the parent-child dyad attempted to complete a novel task. Furthermore, the
phone-engaged parents asked their children fewer information-seeking questions, which
suggests that engagement with personal computers, such as mobile phones, may influence
adult behavior as well. Altogether, we argue that there is less to be learned from observing a
peer or parent communicate through or with a computer.
As discussed, within virtual environments these boundaries are mitigated by the presence of other persons, but in communication with machines they remain, even if tempered
by the collective use of a given machine. For example, although interactions with virtual
assistants (e.g., Alexa) occasionally occur in the presence of other persons, many will occur
in private, and these interactions may be lacking the social stakes necessary for vicarious
reinforcement to occur.
A lower frequency of observational learning and vicarious reinforcement in digital
HMC has implications for social development. If nothing else, it may lead to a developmental calculus (i.e., the ratio of experiential and observational learning) that relies more
heavily on experiential learning. With a considerable amount of digital HMC occurring
experientially and with different consequences, it occurs to us that the scripts, models, or
schema shaped through these digital HMC interactions and relationships may be quite personal.
Significant empirical work is necessary to assess the validity of the preceding claims, as
well as any connections made to data. With that said, a developmental calculus that relies
less on traditional processes of socialization may result in different behavioral norms. Consider, as an example, aggression, particularly a person’s verbalized acts when interacting
with virtual agents. Researchers have observed a high rate of verbal aggression in users’
commentary toward machine agents (10% of language considered abusive in De Angeli &
Brahnam, 2008). Among 59 adolescents that interacted with a female conversational pedagogical agent, nearly 40% of the students were aggressive toward the agent with hypersexualized and dehumanized commentary such as “shut up u hore” and “want to give me
a blow job” (Veletsianos et al., 2008). In the context of online chatting, research has found
individuals were less open, agreeable, extroverted, and conscientious when interacting with
a chatbot as reflected in their messages than when interacting with a human friend initially
(Mou & Xu, 2017).
On their face, these findings are disturbing, and when interpreted at a macro level
they may reflect threats to our interpersonal relationships. We suggest three context-based
explanations for these behaviors, all of which draw on social learning theory. For one, the
increased use of socially inappropriate language may be an outcome of observational learning. Although we have argued that there are fewer opportunities for observational learning
to occur, it may make such acts more important to the third party. In that sense, due to
a lack of diverse interactions, a parent or peer that demonstrates aggression, frustration,
or communicates to nonhuman agents with dehumanizing language may have an outsized influence on the observer. Second, such communication patterns may be the result
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of increased experiential learning and more personalized scripts. Third, the lack of human
presence in digital HMC, regardless of perceptions of social presence, may bring about
interactions that provide fewer considerations of interpersonal norms. In private use, there
may be less anchoring to social norms and practices that might occur during collective use
of a technology (e.g., when families or friends use Alexa in the same room). Although subversion can be a positive, there are desirable interpersonal acts that may be more difficult
to find, or even present, in a more saturated HMC environment. If such behaviors are the
product of an updated calculus of experiential and observational learning in digital HMC,
the scripts or schema being formed through digital HMC may be problematic, especially if
there is an interplay between one’s interpersonal scripts or schema for communication or
relationships, as researchers have observed in virtual environments (Velez et al., 2019; Velez
et al., 2021).
We turn now to the process of message production, with our focus squarely on how
theories of interpersonal communication can be engaged through consideration of the digital HMC context.

Message Production and Goal Structure as Outcomes of the
Digital HMC Context
Communication is context dependent. When our communication partners are digital
machines, rather than humans, how do we change our processes of message production? To
answer this question, it is beneficial, if not imperative, to understand the impact of context
on message production. Originating from the view of message production as a goal-driven
process (for a review, see Meyer, 2021), and in an effort to provide a more comprehensive
and useful understanding of the message production process, Dillard and Solomon (2000)
conceptualized communication context “in terms of perceived empirical regularities in
social reality (i.e., social densities) and the configurations of interpersonal goals that follow
from them (i.e., goal structures)” (p. 167).
Interpersonal communication researchers generally differentiate between two goals in
message production: primary goals, which are the primary reason for producing a message and define the meaning of the interaction, and secondary goals, which are concerns
that arise from considering how to achieve the primary goal and thereby constrain the
interaction (Dillard et al., 1989). For example, while pursuing a primary goal, one may
also need to consider secondary goals, such as maintaining their identities or relationships
with their partner (Clark & Delia, 1979; Dillard et al., 1989). A person may also pursue
secondary goals related to linguistics, such as clarity and relevance in their speech (Hample
& Dallinger, 1987), especially when the environment and the pursuit of the primary goals
heighten such concerns. The configurations of primary and secondary goals constitute goal
structures, which arise in given social densities (Schrader & Dillard, 1998).
Social densities are configurations of the obstacles and opportunities to engage in certain behaviors that people perceive in their social reality (Dillard & Solomon, 2000). Goals
arise within social densities such that people tend to form goals that are possible or allowed
for by the social reality (Heckhausen & Kuhl, 1985), and may also try to overcome the obstacles in cases where the obstacles hinder their goal achievement (Roloff & Janiszewski, 1989).
In other words, the anticipated obstacles and opportunities a message producer perceives
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in a given situation shapes their goal structure. Hence, if the context of digital HMC is
constituted by social regularities that are qualitatively or quantitatively different from their
interpersonal corollary, it follows that different goal structures should arise and, ultimately,
different messages will be produced.
Empirical research has corroborated the proposition that goals both arise within our
social reality and are facilitated and constrained by it; certain goals are more likely to be
triggered in the presence of certain situational factors (e.g., Dillard et al., 1989; Hample,
2016). For example, in an experiment (Hample, 2016, Study 2), participants were randomly
assigned to scenarios with different settings (topics, places, relationship types, sex of the
partner) and were instructed to imagine a conversation that would follow. By examining the
goals that participants reported in the imagined conversations, the researchers found that
an academic setting is less likely to trigger the primary goal of relationship maintenance.
When at least one of the interactants was a woman, though, relationship maintenance was
more likely to be the primary goal pursued. As explained from the perspective illustrated
in Dillard and Solomon (2000), academic settings are more likely to be associated with factors that facilitate professional, rather than personal, activities (i.e., social densities). Hence,
relational goals may be discouraged. When the interactant is a woman, however, the stereotype that women have more interest and expertise in relational issues (i.e., social densities)
may facilitate the pursuit of relational goals.
In another study (Schrader & Dillard, 1998), participants reported the perceived
importance of primary and secondary goals within 1 of 15 social episodes; it was found
that the primary goal of persuasion (i.e., to change attitudes and behaviors) often revolves
around close relationships and is associated with heightened concerns for social appropriateness or politeness (i.e., a secondary goal). Similarly, Wilson et al. (1998) found that the
primary goal of giving advice often prompts a secondary goal of managing or maintaining
the relationship with the target. This is because human partners have the desire to maintain
face; that is, being appreciated while not being impeded by others. The attempt to change
others’ opinions or behaviors may threaten others’ face (Brown & Levinson, 1978). Within
such social regularities, the face-threatening goals should be less inhibited within close
relationships where face protection is of lesser concern; whereas when a primary goal of
persuasion must be pursued outside close relationships, it should be pursued with concerns of face protection and relationship maintenance to avoid reactance and undesired
relational outcomes.
In sum, contextual factors influence message production and design by dictating the
primary and secondary goals. As such, variations of social affordances and broader contextual factors of digital HMC may trigger or inhibit certain goals, leading to differences
in both the content of the primary and secondary goals, as well as the overall complexity
of the goal structure. Next, we discuss how such goals and goal structures intersect with
contextual factors of digital HMC.

Goal Structures in HMC and Implications for HMC Research
Primary Goals in HMC
According to Hample’s theory of interpersonal goals and situations (2016), primary goals
are influenced by obvious factors in the situation ranging from settings and topics to salient
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characteristics of the target. Given the unique features of machines, individuals may pursue
different primary goals in digital HMC, as compared with interpersonal, human communication.
Proper conceptualization of goals in digital HMC requires consideration of core tenets
of goals in communication. For example, in most interpersonal communication situations,
humans are producers or receivers (Shannon & Weaver, 1949). This remains true in our
modern technological landscape, and computers most often serve as a mediator (CMC).
Advances in technologies have complicated this formula. Computers are often now considered distinct sources (Sundar & Nass, 2000), and, in HMC, researchers have suggested that
computers can serve as active receivers as well (Guzman & Lewis, 2020).
Computers have traditionally been designed to help users achieve specific goals.
Because of this, the communication settings or topics in digital HMC are often defined by
the functions of the computers or machines, which then stipulates primary goals accordingly. In other words, an individual’s primary goals in digital HMC are not always emergent,
but they are often defined and confined within the range of that person’s perception of the
computer’s capacities. Because of certain capacities that machines have or lack compared to
humans, either in actuality or perceived by the user, certain primary goals might be more
or less frequently pursued in digital HMC than in human communication. We frame our
discussion in light of commonly held perceptions and beliefs about the capacities of computers and media agents (e.g., Gray et al., 2007; Sundar & Kim, 2019).
According to Sundar (2008), machines are believed to have less fallible “memory” and
are capable of gathering and processing larger amounts of data than humans. Consistent
with this suggestion, many machines are designed to serve as cognitive aids for humans.
For example, many digital technologies provide factual information, keep records, or set
reminders, amongst other similar acts; and users frequently interact with such machines
driven primarily by goals of cognitive assistance, such as seeking accurate information
(Hamilton et al., 2016).
Another unique aspect of machines, compared with human counterparts, is their
heightened degree of agreeability. Machines such as robots and chatbots are designed to
obey and accept users unconditionally. An analysis of user reviews of Replika, a chatbot
that is designed to be a person’s companion, showed that users mentioned the constant
positivity that Replika demonstrated, with comments such as “It always gives me compliments and cheers me up,” making them feel loved and accepted (Ta et al., 2020). Although
unconditional positivity is not always a healthy thing, this characteristic of machines, by
providing the opportunities for more positive conversations, may then facilitate people to
initiate interactions with machines to obtain social support, especially esteem support.
Compared with humans, digital machines have a poorer understanding of complex
human languages and the social context of human affairs. As J. Fox and Gambino (2021)
argued, few, if any, digital machines are designed, or have the capacity, to understand complex social contexts and to have sophisticated, personal conversations with human users,
which are capacities essential for the development of genuine, two-way relationships. For
example, in interviews with users of Replika, they reported frustrations in its lack of ability to understand complex social contexts and norms such as how frequently to bring up
a user’s ex (Skjuve et al., 2021). As a result, people should be less likely to pursue goals
that involve soliciting deep understanding or developing meaningful relationships with
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digital machines. As Mou and Xu (2017) found in their study comparing messages produced during initial conversations with chatbots or people, participants engaged in less
self-disclosure with chatbots, which is considered the key to building relationships (Altman
& Taylor, 1973).
Secondary Goals in HMC
Because machines lack experiential capacities, such as emotions (Gray et al., 2007), as well
as the ability to make social judgments (Sundar & Kim, 2019), secondary goals pertaining
to such capacities that are common in interpersonal communication should be less relevant in HMC. Examples of such secondary goals include, but are not limited to, avoiding
face threats, relationship maintenance, and impression management (Meyer, 2009). These
secondary goals are premised on the target’s inner experience (e.g., face, social judgments,
well-being), which machines lack (Gray et al., 2007). Therefore, they should be activated
less frequently during digital HMC.
Although this argument has not been systematically examined, empirical findings suggest its plausibility. First, the lack of concern for the “feelings” of a machine is supported
by the high rate of verbal aggression observed in HMC, such as verbal aggression toward
machines (De Angeli & Brahnam, 2008; Veletsianos et al., 2008). In addition, researchers have also found that aggression is especially high when less mind is attributed to a
machine agent (Keijsers & Bartneck, 2018), which suggests that lower perceptions of mind
in machines might suppress secondary goals of protecting a target’s feelings or maintaining the relationship while users pursue primary goals such as obtaining information from
machines.
Second, people have reported less concerns of social consequences, or social judgments, during digital HMC. The lack of social concerns in digital HMC is reflected in the
high sensitivity of persons’ self-disclosure to digital machines (Brandtzaeg & Følstad, 2018;
Kretzschmar et al., 2019; Ta et al., 2020). For example, in an experiment where participants
were interviewed by either a faceless computer system or a human, participants disclosed
more sensitive information, with greater detail, to the computer interviewer (Pickard &
Roster, 2020). Similarly, Skjuve et al. (2021) found that many users of Replika moved quickly
to disclosure on personal, intimate topics; skipping the phase of “orientation” (e.g., having
superficial small talks), which is considered the first stage of interpersonal communication for people to get to know each other and establish initial trust according to social
penetration theory (Altman & Taylor, 1973). In their study, some users elaborated on this
phenomenon of moving quickly to personal or intimate disclosures, and the researchers
described it as “they [participants] did not see any social risks in this sharing given Replika’s
non-judgmental character” (Skjuve et al., 2021, p. 5). Skjuve et al. also found that participants self-disclosed to Replika information that they would not typically feel comfortable
disclosing to a human, due to concerns of social norms, such as personal problems and
sexual orientation.
In another study where participants interacted with a chatbot designed to make small
talk, researchers found the chatbot induced deep self-disclosure from participants during
3 weeks of use (Y.-C. Lee et al., 2020). In their follow-up interviews, participants expressed
how carefree they were when answering the chatbot’s sensitive questions, often making
reference to the nonjudgmental or feelingless nature of the chatbot. For example, one
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participant said, “I can say anything to the chatbot. If I’m texting with an anonymous online
person, I still cannot disclose everything. I would think about the person’s feelings and how
s/he would react” (p. 7). Another said,
The chatbot once asked me about a sexual relationship . . . Because [the] chatbot
is not a human, I don’t feel embarrassed. I know that there is a research team
behind the chatbot, but I’m facing only the chatbot when giving my answers, and
feel safe doing so. (p. 7)
Collectively, these findings suggest that the goal of impression management, which is often
associated with the primary goal of self-disclosure in human communication (Meyer, 2009),
may be suppressed or invoked less frequently in digital HMC, which then facilitates more
carefree self-disclosure with machines (Brandtzæg et al., 2021).
Compared to humans, machines are less subject to biological constraints. For example,
a machine does not need rest and a machine can be mass-produced and distributed to
multiple users simultaneously without compromising its performance, though machines
often require maintenance and human resources to maintain a level of performance. Due to
biological factors, digital machines are less constrained by time and space than humans and
they can be more mobile and can produce, or work, without physical or mental constraints.
Therefore, individuals engaging in digital HMC should have less concern about social
appropriateness related to digital machines’ availability in terms of time and space and less
concern about burdening or inconveniencing a machine partner, because a machine does
not endure any loss by allocating time and “attention” to a user. By contrast, when interacting with a human partner, the appropriateness of time and location to initiate a conversation does matter for the communication processes and consequences.
These propositions are supported by empirical findings. For example, users of Replika
reported that when they needed to talk (e.g., when they were stressed), they would go to
Replika because it would not matter if they were on the bus or at a restaurant, and they did
not need to bug their potentially busy friends. Further, users explicitly mentioned that Replika had qualities that humans do not have, such as being available at all times and therefore
easier to open up to (Skjuve et al., 2021). In the user reviews of Replika, its availability was
frequently mentioned as one of its merits (Ta et al., 2020). In another study of Woebot,
a chatbot for mental health, users specifically mentioned and valued its nature of being
unconstrained by time and space, allowing them to potentially just sit on the subway or in
their room and receive informational support (Bae Brandtzæg et al., 2021).
Such qualities of digital machines may suppress or deactivate goals related to selecting
an appropriate time and space to initiate a conversation, and therefore reduce the cognitive burden of people. This may, in turn, lead people to pursue their primary goals with
machines more frequently than with humans. With that said, social technologies vary in
terms of their locatability and portability (Rodríguez-Hidalgo, 2020; Schrock, 2015). For
example, social robots may be less flexible (e.g., harder to move, requiring electricity to
operate) than chatbots, and therefore social robots may activate secondary goals related to
time and space more frequently.

Gambino and Liu

121

In addition to suppressing these secondary goals common in human communication,
digital HMC may trigger novel secondary goals that are not frequently considered during
common acts of human communication. First, because machines are deficient in their ability to understand and contextualize human communication, secondary goals related to
understandability or efficiency may be triggered. For example, Muresan and Pohl (2019)
found that users of Replika reported limitations in its conversational capabilities, and users
were therefore concerned about the degree to which a machine would understand them.
Second, digital machines are often high in recordability (e.g., digital or digitized messages are often stored in a database). Such a high level of recordability may trigger concerns
of privacy and confidentiality when the communication involves the disclosure of personal
or sensitive information. This may lead persons to consider a secondary goal of information
protection, leading to less breadth and depth in self-disclosure. For example, some Replika
users have reported that they were concerned about how it would manage their private
information; to address these concerns, they investigated Replika’s terms on privacy and
information security, asked Replika about how their data would be stored and who would
have access to it, or contacted the provider to request such information when they wanted
to disclose private information to Replika (Skjuve et al., 2021). Additionally, when designed
with more transparent privacy policies for data processing and storage, robots provide a
better user experience (Vitale et al., 2018).

Goal Structure and the Interplay Between Primary and
Secondary Goals in HMC
In human communication, “primary goals bring about secondary goals” (Dillard & Solomon, 2000, p. 171). That is, primary goals are found to be reliably associated with certain
secondary goals as discussed (e.g., Schrader & Dillard, 1998; Wilson et al., 1998). In digital
HMC, however, these structures, or common configurations, may be affected by contextual factors of the interactant and relationship. As we have argued, concerns for the target’s
well-being, the speaker-target relationship, and social judgments on the speaker, which are
common secondary goals in human communication, are likely to manifest in qualitatively
or quantitatively different forms in digital HMC. For example, to solicit help from a digital
machine or to disclose a personal failure need not always trigger concerns for one’s own
face, a secondary goal of impression management that is frequently triggered in the interpersonal corollaries (Meyer, 2009; Wilson et al., 1998). As a result, differences, in terms of
both the complexity and the content of goal structure, may exist between digital HMC and
human communication. Specifically, we expect a simpler goal structure in HMC (i.e., fewer
secondary goals) as compared with interpersonal, human communication.
As for the content of the goal structure, we may also observe different configurations of
goal structures in digital HMC. Compared to the human communication corollary, certain
primary goals may pair more or less frequently with secondary goals. For example, primary
goals that involve complex problem-solving (e.g., obtaining support for a malfunctioning
product) may trigger concerns of a machine’s ability to understand and contextualize language or to respond in a contingent manner. These reflect secondary goals that are likely to
be less relevant or less frequent in conversations with a human agent.
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Implications for Processes of Communication and Socialization
Message production is goal-driven. Understanding the context of digital HMC in terms
of individuals’ goal structures and broader processes of socialization allows us to make
insightful and focused inquiries into the processes and outcomes of digital HMC. In the
remainder of this manuscript, we discuss the micro and macro level implications of considering processes of socialization and individuals’ goal structures for research in HMC. We
close the manuscript with a discussion on research practices, encouraging our colleagues to
consider the importance of context to increase the internal validity of our work.
The differences in individuals’ goal structures when they interact with computers and
humans may explain the differences between HMC and human communication observed,
such as less intimacy and self-disclosure (Mou & Xu, 2017) and high aggression (De Angeli
& Brahnam, 2008; Strait et al., 2017; Veletsianos et al., 2008) in HMC. Alternatively, or
concurrently, a deficit in observational learning may lead to such outcomes as a person
develops personalized scripts for use that encourage aggression, without punishment, and
seeks and finds fewer rewards for intimacy or self-disclosure.
Further, we argue that differences in the content, complexity, and configurations of goal
structures in digital HMC and human communication may have downstream effects on
human communication and, in the long run, our social skills. For example, soliciting cognitive aid is a prominent goal in digital HMC, and we can reasonably expect to observe a large
number of digital HMC interactions to be question-answer type prompts. With the primary and secondary goals of relational maintenance and development suppressed in such
interactions, we expect to observe fewer relational talks, discussions on complex issues, and
lower self-disclosure depth which may result in a person developing less social-emotional
skills, particularly those related to narratives and emotions. Because we have limited time
and abilities to communicate, when we consider the socialization process, this allows us to
see a more dire outcome of a person’s engagement with digital interlocutors. Although such
effects may not be observable in a single, or even across multiple, studies, as we have argued,
there is theoretical justification for the consideration of how repeated engagement in less
personal, sophisticated communication may influence one’s interpersonal expectations and
behaviors.
On a more micro level, with considerations for a machine as a social other, such as the
machine’s well-being, judgments, face, availability (i.e., secondary goals) suppressed, we
expect higher directness and lower politeness in messages sent to machines than to humans
under the same primary goals. We also expect people to engage in digital HMC with fewer
temporal and spatial constraints.
When the secondary goal of being understood is triggered, we expect messages in HMC
reflect more effort of accommodation; the use of less complex words and sentences, more
context-independent messages, and more paraphrasing when compared to interpersonal
communication. Additionally, if the secondary goal of privacy management is triggered,
messages of self-disclosure in HMC may contain less private information. For example,
individuals may be less willing to disclose information that may incriminate them to a therapist chatbot than to a human therapist, as a computer therapist is likely to have a digital
record of the disclosure.
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As we have argued, individuals may have a simplified goal structure in digital HMC,
due to the suppression of many secondary goals common in human communication. A corollary to interpersonal communication suggests that individuals of low cognitive complexity or low cognitive resources may handle digital HMC better than human communication.
Following, they may choose to achieve goals through digital HMC over human communication, or they may choose to engage more frequently with computers. This could explain
why people prefer humans vs. machines for a certain task, as well as lead to the development
of personalized scripts for interactions with computers.
Although our discussion so far focuses on the distinctive qualities of HMC context,
similarities between interpersonal communication and digital HMC do exist, and in explicating context, it is worthwhile to note these as well. For example, Berger’s plan-based theory of strategic communication (Berger, 1995, 1997) suggests that individuals will first use
the available plan in long-term memory, but once frustration occurs, may seek alternative
communication plans. In cases when the human-machine differences are irrelevant for the
achievement of certain goals so that no frustrations occur, we expect similarities between
interpersonal communication and digital HMC when individuals will apply well-learned,
interpersonal scripts effectively.

Implications for Theory Development
There remains considerable value in findings that demonstrate similarities and differences
between humans and machines (Edwards & Edwards, 2022; Ho et al., 2018). It is only
through acknowledging differences and similarities at the larger level that more focused
theoretical inquiries can be organized and examined. Now, we suggest moving forward
with the study of computers and digital machines, focusing less on the global differences
between humans and machines in general and more on the social affordances provided and
enacted through HMC (Liu, 2018, 2021). Although in our previous discussion we made the
contrast between HMC and human communication, we have discussed the goal structures
in HMC in light of specific machine affordances and the lack of thereof. Social technologies
vary in each particular form, and machines are developed in relation to the impossible to
be known advances in underlying technologies of the future; thus, we recommend that
predictions on the goal structures and communication with machines should be made with
consideration of specific machine affordances.
Considering the differences between the goal structures in digital HMC and human
communication, we argue there are several limitations in the current paradigms of HMC
research and point out some alternative directions. In many digital HMC studies, participants are instructed to communicate with machines in a given context, with primary goals
predefined or specified by the researchers, and then asked to evaluate the interaction experience and the machine agent (e.g., Edwards et al., 2020; Liu & Sundar, 2018). Considering
the effects of machine affordances on primary goals, while also considering the effects of
primary goals on secondary goals (Hample, 2016), such a research paradigm may artificially induce two antecedents for communication that might be nonexistent in natural settings: the goal that researchers stipulate for the interaction and an evaluation goal, which
may distort the processes of digital HMC. These threats to ecological and external validity
take on additional weight when considered with the arguments in this manuscript.
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As empirical researchers, we are often trained to purposefully ignore or downplay
threats of ecological and external validity to maximize internal validity, but without appropriate explication and consideration of the digital HMC context, we believe we may be
adding artificiality to a naturally occurring process of digital HMC, therefore increasing
threats to the internal validity of the findings. The similarities observed between human
communication and digital HMC might be due to such an artifact of forcing primary goals
to be identical, when, in actuality, the goals would have not been the same in the first place.
To mitigate this threat, researchers may consider recording participants’ goals in natural
settings with methods such as experience sampling or surveys. Additionally, more clarity
on the context of digital HMC may emerge through methods such as interviews or diary
studies. We encourage researchers to undertake these methods with consideration of the
digital HMC context situated both within and against existing theories, so that these methods may be used to provide a rich and focused description of HMC. We hope that with
such understanding, deductive methods such as experiments can be employed to test causal
relationships with less threats to both internal and external validity.

Conclusion
Through consideration of the digital HMC context, we have situated empirical findings
and adjusted theoretical propositions of human communication and socialization. In these
reconfigurations, we see benefits to communication scholars as our perspectives on social
learning theory and goal structures focus directly on acts of communication. We look to
the future of research in communication with hope, and we present these propositions for
empirical testing, but also as examples of the means to theoretical engagement. We do not
consider this manuscript to present anywhere close to a comprehensive integration of contextual factors of digital HMC or theories of communication and socialization. Instead, we
encourage our colleagues to take these as examples and dive into theoretical spaces where
their interests lie.
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